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Authors . . . the exclusive
Right to their respective
Copyright law affects
Writings" to "promote the
librarie in many ways. It
Progress of Science and
protects the core activities
useful Arts."; In 1976,
of most libraries - collecting ~~~~~~~~~~~::::::=========-.:._..:._____, Congress concluded more
information resources and
than a decade of bearings and debate by passing a new
making them available to the public. This is no small
Copyright Act that substantially rewrote · .. copyright
accomplishment. Other countries (for example, Great
law! Under the prior law, which had been enacted in
Britain) charge a royalty every time a library loans a
1909,~ federal copyright protection applied only to
1
book. opyright Jaw protects the original expression
limited categories of works and then only if the work
of librarians and library staff, and helps clarify which
was published; 6 required strict compliance wid1 a
rights belong to the library and which to the individual
variety of formalities, including registration with me
creators. Although copyright law is generally highly
Copyright Office and publication with appropriate
protective of the interests of libraries, it al o provides
copyright notice/ and lasted for only 28 years (56
for liability when libraries, or in some ca. es ilieir
years, if the copyright was renewed).~
employees or even their patron , infringe the copyThe 1976 Act substantially broadened and extended
rights of others.
federal copyright protection . Rather than protecting
The proliferation of the Internet and other digital
only specified categories of works, Congress app lied
te hnologies has expanded the importance of copycopyright law to all works of authorship ,9 provided that
right law not only to libraries, but to virtually every
they were "ftxed " and "original," regardless of whether
egmcnt of U.S. society. As statutes, judicial opinion~,
they were published. A work is "f'Lxed" when it is
and legal holarship race to adapt to this technologtcal
embodied, by or with the permission of its creator, in
hangc, the application of copyright law has become
"any tangible medium of expression" from which the
both more comp lex and more uncertain. Again,
work can be "perceived, reproduced or otherwise
libraries may be especially vulnerable to this complexity
communicated, either directly or with the aiel of a
and uncertainty because many libraries both use and
machine or device ... for a period of more than
make ava ilable to th public technologies - photocopitransitory duration." 11J A work may be fLXecl on paper,
ers, videotap e and elise players and recorders, netvideotape, disk, or on many oilier forms of med ia, but
worked computer , tape recorders, online database ,
not on a television or computer screen because d1ese
CD-ROMs fa simile machines - each one of which has
images are of only "transitory duration." A work is
among its primary u es the infringement of copyrighted
"original" if it is "ind ependently created by the author
w rks .
(as opposed to copied from other works) , and .. .
Congres rook its first step towards addressing d1is
possesses at least some minimal degree of creativity." 11
situation in October 1998 when it passed the Digital
These requirements are deliberately broad and easy to
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) .2 The Act creates
satisfy. As a result, copyright law now protects every
signill ant new rights for copyright holders and new
letter, memo, note, home video, answering machine
d ·f ·n cs for opyright users, both of which are potenmessage, e-mail, and doodle.
tia lly riti al to the activities of most libraries. This
Moreover, unlike other areas of intellectual
arti 1c provides a brief overview of the current state of
property, the 1976 Act, as amended in 1988 12 and again
U.. copyright law and a s ummary of me DMCA's recent
in 1998, 13 does not require compliance wid1 statutory
·hange to that law that are likely to affect libraries.
formalities or application to d1e government as a
condition for protection. 1" Protection begins as soon as
II. OVERVIEW OF COPYRIGHT LAW
the work is "fLXecl" - whether or not the author wishes
opyright law in the Uni ted States is based on me
the work to be protected - and lasts for 70 years past
opyright Clau e in the U.S. Constitution, which
the life of the author. ~ If the author is an organization,
mpower Congress to "secur[ e] tor limited Times to
protection lasts for 120 years after creation or 95 years
I. INTRODUCTION
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after publication, whichever expires first. 16 nder
current copyright law, protection is easy to come by,
long-lasting, and difficult to lose.
The rights protected under current law are equally
expansive. Copyright law gives a creator, or, in some
circumstances, a creator's employer, 17 five exclu ive
rights: the right to reproduce, adapt distribute,
publicly perform, and publicly display a copyrighted
work.18 For the period covered by the copyright, the
law permits only the copyright holder to engage in, or
authorize someone else to engage in, any activity
covered by the five exclusive rights. In addition, the
1976 Act grants to the copyright owner the right to
control importation of copyrighted works into the
United States. 19
The exclusive rights may be transferred or licensed
individually or collectively, for use by others.~l1 Trans- '
fers and exclusive licenses must be in writing; nonexclusive licenses may be granted orally or even implied. 2' The transferee or exclusive licensee is entitled
"to the extent of that right, to all of the protection and
remedies accorded to the copyright owner by this
title." 22 The new copyright holder or exclusive licensee
can enforce his or her rights against even the original
creator or copyright holder. 2·1
Courts have interpreted copyright law's infringement provisions very broadly. Individuals and institutions are liable nor only for their own conduct, but also
for the conduct of emp loyees (under the doctrine of
respondeat superior~•); the conduct of anyone whom
they supervise and in whose work they have a financial
interest (vicarious infringement); 25 and the conduct of
anybody whose infringing activity they knowingly
induce, cause, or to which they materially contribute
(contributory infringement). 2 ~ Libraries run the risk of
liability- if their conduct is not protected by a statutory
defense, discussed below- under contributory infringement when they provide patrons with botb copyrighted
material (e.g. , books) and access to the means for
copying that material (e.g. , a photocopier), with
knowledge that patrons will likely use the latter to
infringe the copyright in the former . The law does not
require that the defendant intend to infringe, or,
except in the case of contributory infringement, even
have knowledge of the infringing conduct. Innocent
intent or lack of knowledge may affect damages , but
they do nor affect liability.n
The 1976 Act provides significant penalties for
violating the exclusive rights, including injunctions,28
impoundment and destruction of infri nging cop ies, 29
actual damages and lost profits,~ statutory damages/ '
court costs,:\ 2 and attorneys' fees.~ 3 The Act also provides crimin al penalties for "[a]ny person who infringes
a copyright willfully and for purposes of commercial
advantage or private financial gain."3•
0

Although broad copyright protection in the nited
States is not limitles . The most significant limit in
copyright today is that t11e law protect expre sion
only. o matter how original or creative, "[i]n no ca e
does copyright protection for an original ork of
authorship e>-'tend to any id a, procedure, process,
system, method of operation concept principle or
discovery, regardle of the form in which it i d scribed eA"J)lained illu trated or embodied in uch
work. "5' In Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone
Service Company, a unanimous upreme Court
stressed : "The mo t fundamental axiom of copyright
law is that '[n]o author may copyright his idea or the
facts he narrate . . . .' (C]opyright assure authors the
right to their original e..xpression but n ourages
others to build freely upon the idea and information
conveyed by a work. " 5~
As a result courts will not protect expres i n if it
includes one of a limited number of ways of conveying
an id a concept or fact, or if it is nece sa.ry to imp! menting an idea or concept. nder the doctrine of
"merger,'' courts withhold copyright prot ction from
original tlxed expre · ion if t11at e..xprcs ·ion "must
necessarily be u eel as incident to" the work's underlying ideas or data. ' In that ituation, courts tlnd that
t11e expression and t11e underlying idea or fact have
"merged."5H The doctrine of merger highlights the
importance of preventing copyright law from ever
protecting a fact or idea: it is preferable to exclude
otherwise prorectable expression from copyright la,v's
monopoly rather than to allow that monopoly ro
e>-'tend to any fact or idea.

Copyright protection is al o subject to four other
signitkant limitations relevant to librari s. The "first
sale" doctrine codified in ection 109 /~ limits copyright owners ' rights by subjecting nly th initial
distribution of a particular copy of a copyright d work
ro their control. The first sale do trine provicl s rhat
once the copyright holder has distributed or authorized the distribution of opies of her opyrighted
work, subsequent possessors of those c pies may
redistribute them without the copyright holder's
permission. '" Without the first sale doctrine, reselling,
lending, or giving away a copy of a copyrighted work
would violate the copyright holder's exclusive distribution right. -' 1 The first sale doctrine is therefore
particularly important to libraries .
Copyright law also includes specific exe mptions
from the exclusive rights to publicly display and
perform copyrighted works. Section 109 exe mpts the
public display of a lawful copy of a copyrighted work
by its rightful owner. 2 Without this exemption , it
would be a violation of the co pyright law to publicly
display a photograph, painting, or othe r copyrighted
work without the permission of the copyright owner.
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This exemption applies whether the display is direct
(e.g., hanging the painting) or by projection of no
more than one image at a time (e.g., showing slides of
one or more paintings in series). However, the viewers
must be "present at the place where the copy is located."H Again, because this provision permits the
public display of book jackets and other copyrighted
material, it is important to libraries.
"Fair use" constitutes a statutory defense to copyright infringement. According to the 1976 Act, certain
u e of copyrighted works may be fair "for purposes
such as criticism, comment, news reporting, reaching
(including multiple copies for classroom u e), scholarship, or research ."·•·' Fair use expressly permits certain
uses of copyrighted works that serve important public
purpo es and that do nor harm the market for the
original work. The Act sets out four factors for courts to
consider when determining whether an otherwise
infringing u e is fair:s Courts often focu on the fourth
factor: "the effect of the use upon the potential tor or
value of the copyrighted work."46 According to the
Supreme Court, unauthorized uses of copyrighted
works are unfair (1) if it is proved that the particular
use is harmful to the market for the original work, or
(2) if it is shown by a preponderance of the evidence
that "should [the use] become "videspread, it would
adversely affect the potential market for the copyrighted work."''7 Fair use immunizes activities such as
quoting portions of a book or song in a review; its
value ro libraries is clear.
Fi nally, Section 108 provides for defense specifically applicable to libraries. Section 108 esrabli hes
certain "safe harbors" - situations in which libraries and
archive and their patrons may reproduce and distribute co pies of copyrighted works without infringing.
This provi ion permit limited photocopying of books
and periodicals for scholarly or archival purposes as
long as the opying is neither systematic nor a substitute tor purchase or subscription. 4ij To qualify, a library
or archives must make its collections available to the
public or to unaffiliated persons doing research in
appropriate fields. ' 9 Moreover, the reproduction or
distribution must be made without direct or indirect
ommercial advantage. St' ection 108 also permits
interlibrary loan photocopying "of no more than one
article or orb r ontriburion ro a copyrighted collection or periodi al is ue " or "a small part of any other
copyrighted work," subject to important limitationsY
Finally, Section 108 appears to absolve libraries and
library employees for infringement resulting from "the
unsupervi ed use of reproducing equipment located
on it premi es," provided that "such equipment
eli plays a notice that the making of a copy may be
subject to the copyright law ."~ 2
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Ill. DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT

The DMCA creates important new rights for both
copyright holders and users. Although intended to
resolve issues presented by digital technologies, the
DMCA has considerably broader impact. It is a complex
piece of legislation consisting of five titles, only three
of which are relevant to the activities of libraries.
A. Title I - WIPO Treaties Implementation
Title I of the DMCA implements two World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) treaties: The \XIIPO
Copyright Treaty and The \XIIPO Performances and
Phonograms Treaty, adopted at the \XIIPO Diplomatic
Conference in December 1996. Those treaties require
member nations to protect digitally transmitted works
in two ways:
(1) to provide legal remedies against the circumvention of technological measures designed to block
access to copyrighted works and
(2) to prohibit the interference witl1 copyright
management information digitally encoded in copyrighted works, including information about copyright
ownership and licensing terms.
1. Anti-Circumvention

The Act achieves the first purpose by adding
Section 1201 to the copyright law. The new section
prohibits the circumvention of technological measures
taken by copyright owners to control access to t11eir
works or to prevent the unauthorized exercise of the
copyright owner's exclusive rights . Section 1201(a)
applies to circumvention for tl1e purpose of obtaining
access to a work, and prohibits both circumventing
technological measures that impede access and
"manufactur(ing] , import[ing], offer[ing] to tl1e public,
provid(ing], or otherwise traffic(ingj in any technology, product, sen>ice, device, component, or part
thereof' that is primarily designed to circumvent
technological measures designed to control access to a
work.B
This provision takes effect two years after enactment of tl1e DMCA, on October 28, 2000. During this
two-year period, the Librarian of Congress is to conduct a rulemaking proceeding to evaluate the impact of
the prohibition against the act of circumventing the
acces control measures set forth in the Act.~.,
Congress recognized legitimate reasons tor engaging in circumvention. Accordingly, Title I specifically
provides for one broad and six specific exceptions to
the prohibition on circumvention and circumvention
devices.s~ One is specifically applicable to nonprofit
libraries. Section 1201(d) provides an exemption for
nonprofit libraries, arcl1ives, and educational institutions to gain access to commercially exploited copy-
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righted works solely to make a good faith determination of whether to acquire the work. The exemption
applies only if a qualifying institution cannot obtain a
copy of the .work by other means. 5f'
2. Copyright Management Information
Section 1202 of the DMCA prohibit altering
"copyright management information" (CMI) and creates
liability for any person who provides or distributes fal e
CMP In addition, the Act prohibits the intentional
removal or alteration of CM1, and its kno·wing distribution in altered form. 5s "CMI" includes all identifying
infom1ation involving the author or performer, the
terms and conditions for the use of the work, and
other information such as e mbedded pointers and
hypertext links.59 These provisions respond to the use
of digital technologies' ability to encode significant
amounts of data, whicl1 can be used to identity the
copyright owner and to facilitate the licensing of
copyrighted works. Pertinent information such a
name and addres , telephone number, fax number, email address, and licensing rates, can be encoded into
the work and displayed to a potential cu stome r. For
works available over digital networks, embedded links
to the copyright owner can make electronic licensing
even more convenient. As more and more works
become available in electronic form , this informatio n
cou ld sign ificantly reduce the transaction costs associated with copyright licensing and greatly enhance
enforcement of copyright laws.
The DMCA creates civi l remedies and criminal
penalties for violations of Sections 1201 and 1202.(>0
The Act provides for statutory damages of as great as
$2 ,500 per act of circumvention, and up to $25,000 for
each violation of the CMI provisions. 6 1 The Act gives
courts wide discretion to gra nt injunctions and award
dan1ages, costs, and attorney's fees, and also to reduce
damage awards agai nst innoce nt violators.c.z For nonprofit libraries, archives, or edu cational institutions,
however, courts must remit damages if they find that
the violator had no reason to know of the violation 63
In addition, criminal penalties do not apply to nonprofit libraries, arcl1ives, and ed ucational institutions .c'"'
The new CMI provisions raise many concerns that
have yet to be resolved by courts. Although targeted at
copyright-related information imbedded in digital files ,
the provisions are not limited to electronic works. To
be covered by the Act, the CMI must be conveyed with
a copyrighted work. 65 As a result, these new provisions
would prohibit removing or altering information about
the creator, copyright, license terms, and the like
concerning any copyrighted work. Arguably, this
extends not only to reproducing a copyrighted work,
bur to any use made of such a work, for example, a
quote in a review. Including all of the original work's
CMI in such a situation will likely prove cumbersome
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or even impossible. Moreover, tl1ere is no indication in
the DMCA that the CMI provi ions are subject to fair
use or other defenses. Finally, the damages for violating CMI provisions - 25,000 for each violation - are
considerable. Taken together, the e factor lead to th
fear that copyright holders will sue pos ible infringers
in the future not for their alleged infringement (which
is often difficult and time-consuming to prove) but
rather for violating the CMI provision . Although
libraries are exempt from criminal penaltie and face
reduced civil dan1age if they had no reason to know
that they were removing CMI, the potential threat f
significant and easy-to-obtain dan1ages under the CMI
provision is neverth 1 ss significant.
B. Title II - Online Copyright Infringement Liability
Limitation
The DMCA include important new provision
applicable ro "o nline service provider " (0 Ps) . Although few libraries might think of th mselves as 0 Ps,
the law defines the t rm very broadly as "a provider of
online services or network access, or the operator f
facilities therefor. "66 Becau e some libraries do provid
Internet acces e-mail, chat room , web page hosting,
and otl1er transmission routing, and conn tion
services, and more are likely to do so in the future a
brief summary of th 0 P provisions is warranted.
However, the OSP provisions are d railed and technical, so it i on ly possibl to provide a broad overview
below.
Prior to enactment of the DM A, som court had
found that OSPs were liable - both directly and contributorily - for tl1e infringing conduct of t11e users of
their services.67 Title II of the DM A limits 0 P liability
in tl1ree important situ ations , discussed below. Beginning on Octob r 28, 1998, these exemptions from
liability add to any defense that an 0 P might have
under copyright Ia\¥. These e..xemptions do not constitute comp lete defenses to copyright inf rin gement suits.
Ratl1er, they eliminate the availabi lity of monetary
damages, and redu e the situations in which injun tions may be granted.
1. Transmission a nd Routing- ection 512 (a)

Title II of the DMCA insulate 1lll 0 P from liability
when it is merely acting as a passive conduit for
materials passing between other parrics.c>li T his provision applies only if the following concliti ns are met:
(1) the transmission of the material was initiated by
or at the direction of a person other than the service
provider;
(2) the transmission, routing, provision of connections, or storage is carried out through an automatic
technical process without selection of the mate rial by
the service provider;
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(3) the service provider does not select the recipients of the mate rial except as an automatic response to
the request of another person;

(2) in the absence of such actual knowledge , is not
aware of facts or circum ranees from which infringing
activity is ap parent;

(4) no copy of the material made by the service
provider in the course of such intermediate or transie nt srorage is maintained on the system or network in
a m a nne r ord inarily acce sible to anyone other than
a nticipated recipients, and no such copy is m aintained
on the system or network in a manner ordinarily
acce sible ro uch a nticipated recipients for a longer
period than is reasonably nece sary for the transmissio n, routing, o r provision of connections; and

(3) upon obtaining su ch knowledge or awarenes ,
acts exped itiou ly to remove, or disable access to the
material;

(5) the m ate ri al is transmitted through the system
or network without mod ification of its content.69
Collectively, these conditions require that the role
of the 0 P is entirely passive towards the allegedly
in frin ged material.
2. ystem Caching - Section 512 (b)
Virtually all networked computers "cache" docume nts - that is, they store a copy of the document on
the hard drive for faster reference in the future. This
allows co mpute rs ro manage large files and also ro
provide for s peedier access to commonly used or
recently used documents. Since cach ing necessarily
involves making a copy of a file, it would like ly constinlt(; co pyright infringe me nt. The DMCA provides that
caching i · no r copyright infringeme nt, provided that
the OSP is n or it ell' downloading material for storage
or altering the content of cached material, and that the
OSP co mpli es with industry standards related to
caching.'o
3. Storing and Linking- Section 512(c)-(d)
Finally, Title II of the DMCA limits OSP liability
under the copyright law for two common OSP activities: (1) storing material, such a a web page, on a
serv r;' 1 and (2) r ferring users ro material at other
o nline sires through hypertext links.72 The former
wou ld clearly co n ritute co pyright infringement, absent
the defense provided by the OMCA, because it involves
reproducing (as well as, pe rhap , publicly displaying)
co pyrighted material. It is un etrled whether me rely
lin king to a ite could co nstitute copyright infringem ·nr, r whether the operator of a web page could be
onrriburorily liable for linking to another page that
ontain ·cl infringing material. Fortunately, this provision of the DMCA makes the resolution of those issues
unnecessary. The Act limits Liability based on the
material be ing rored or referred to if the OSP meets
rh following conditions:
(1) does not have actu al knowledge that the
m at rial or a n activity using the material on the system
r network is infringing·
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(4) does not receive a financial benefit directly
attributable to the infringing activity, in a case in which
the service provider has the right a nd ability to control
such activity; and
(5) upon notification of claimed infringement . . .
responds expeditiously to re move, or disable access to,
the mate rial that is claimed to be inJringing or to be tl1e
subject of infringing activity. 7 3
4. Threshold Conditions
To qualify for a ny of the exemptions in Title II, an
OSP must meet three general conditions. First, it must
ado pt, implement, and inform its subscribers and
account holders of irs policy providing for termination
of users who are repeat infringers. 74 Second, the 0 P
must accommodate and not interfere with "standard
technical measures" used by copyright owners to
identify and protect copyrighted works. 7 ~ Third, an 0 P
must comply with th e DMCA's "notice and takedown
provisions." These provisions are covered in minute
detail in the OMCA, but tl1ey basically require tl1at the
OSP (1) designate an agent to receive notifications of
claimed copyright infringe m e nt, and (2) provide
publicly (including on the 0 P's web site) the name,
address, phone number, and electronic mail address of
the agent. 76 Significantly, as Professor Marshall Leaffer
has written, "an OSP does not need to monitor its
service or a.fftrmatively seek out information about
copyright infringement on its service, except to accommodate technical measures described above.'m
The importance of these provisions can hardly be
overstated. They effectively codified the result of
Religious Technology Center v. etcom On-Line
Communications Services/ 11 w hich h eld that e rcom
o pe rator of a sener bulleti n board, should not be
held trictly liable for user infringeme nt of w hi ch it had
no knowledge. Moreover, under tl1ese provisions,
compliance with fairly straightforward requirements can
eliminate much of the unce rtainty s urrounding
Internet-related copyright complaints; Libraries no
longer need to guess what the law bas to say about
how tl1ey h a ndle su ch complaints. On the other hand,
should a library fail to take the simp le step of designating and registering an agent with the Library of Congress, it loses all of the protection provided by Title II
of the OMCA.
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5. Additional Provisions
Finally, Title II provides for liability for knowingly,
falsely claiming that material or activity is infringing,~
and protects OSPs from liability for ' good faith disabling of access to, or removal of, material or activity
claimed to be infringing or based on facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent,
regardless of whetl1er the material or activity is ultimately determined to be infringing." '
C. Title IV - Sec. 404 - Exemption for libraries and
arcluves
With only one exception, the balance of the DMCA
contains no provisions relevant to libraries. That
exception is a small but important amendment to
Section 108 of the copyright law, which, as noted
above, provide special protections for libraries. As
amended by the DMCA, qualifying libraries may now
make three copies - instead of only one - of an unpubli hed work for pre ervation or for deposit for research
usc by another Hbrary or archives.81 Libraries may make
three copies of a published work that is "damaged,
deteriorating, lost, or stolen, or if the existing format
in which the work is stored has become obsolete,"
provided that the library has not been able to locate an
unused replacement at "a fair price," and that if the
new copies are in digital format, that they are not made
available to the public in that format outside of the
library.xz In this case, the DMCA not only increased the
number of copies, but also added the language about
obsolete formats , which the Act defines as being the
ca e if "the machine or device necessary to render
perceptible a work stored in that format is no longer
manufactured or is no longer reasonably available in
the commercial marketplace." 8 ~ Finally, prior to passage
of the DMCA, Section 108 provided that libraries could
reproduce and distribute a single copy of a copyrighted
work, provided that they met certain conditions,
including placing appropriate copyright notice on the
copy. This had led to the question of what libraries
should do when the original work being copied had
no copyright notice. The DMCA resolved that question
by providing that in such a situation libraries should
si mply afftx a statement that tl1e work may be protected
by copyright. 84

IV. CONCLUSION
U.S. copyright law has traditional ly been very
protective of the activities of libraries and librarians.
The DMCA is no exception to this laudable trend. The
Act expands the protections afforded libraries in
Section 108, provides significant new protections for
online activities, and offers important clarification for
how complaints of online infringement are to be
handled. Many of the protections of the DMCA,
however, turn on compliance ·wi.tl1 quite technical
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(altl10ugh seldom burdensome) requirements, such a
the designation and registration of an agent to receive
notices of alleged online infringement. In addition,
the Act does create the potential of new liability for
librarie especially for removing or altering CMI. E'en
in the face of new liability however the Act refl cts tl1e
law's longstanding olicitude for librarie by providing
for reduced dan1ages .
At present a number of the DMCA's provision are
not applicable to many libraries because few libraries
today act as OSPs. But this is certain to change a - more
and more libraries expand d1eir Internet senrices. As
tl1at happens attention to tl1e details of the DMCA "ill
become increasingly important if libraries are to realize
tl1e full protection of the law.
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